

MEMORANDUM  
TO : THE COMMANDER, 40th Combat Wing (H) AAF  
Office of the Operations Officer

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LPO #557  
10 April 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Planning and Execution of Operations of Mission 10 April 1944, Stettin, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 92nd Bombardment Group (H) AAF, 120 547.

1. Summary of Planning and Execution.

A. The bomb loading for this operation was received from Headquarters 40th Combat Wing by Capt. Frasse at 1200 hours 10 April 1944. The order called for twenty-one (21) B-17's to be loaded with 10 x 500 Gp bombs each with 1/10 second nose fuse and 1/100 second tail fuse, and seven (7) B-17's to be loaded with maximum 1-47 Al T.B.'s.

B. The Field Order was received from Headquarters 1st Bomb Division by Capt. Frasse at 2350 hours 10 April 1944. Flight plan and details of the mission were completed, briefing being set for 0415 hours and take-off time 0720 hours.

2. General Narrative, 92nd Bomb Group.

A. Main Bomb Group Formation (Lead) 40th Combat Wing.

(1). Take-off was accomplished by twenty-one (21) aircraft of the 92nd Bomb Group beginning at 0715 hours for assembly over the Lodigitz River at 0730 hours. At 0800 hours the 92nd Bomb Group was ordered to rendezvous with the low and high groups of the 40th Combat Wing. The 92nd Bomb Group followed the planned route over England as briefed and the 1st Division assembly with the 40th Combat Wing leading was accomplished with little difficulty.

(2). The group left Orfordness 0912 hours at 12,200 feet and entered the enemy coast five (5) miles south of course 0948 hours at 15,000 feet.

(3). The route over enemy territory to the Primary I.P. was followed according to flight plan. At the Primary I.P. the group leader decided to attack the secondary target because the Primary was obscured by 10/10 cloud cover. A right turn was then completed and a heading of 270 degrees was maintained to an established I.P. for the secondary target. After the secondary I.P. a bombing run on a magnetic heading of 49 degrees was begun. However before the secondary target was reached the target was covered by 2/3 dense low clouds. The group leader immediately turned to a magnetic heading of 105 degrees and bombed the center of Stettin, a target of opportunity at 1255 hours.

(4). Following the planned route the group departed the enemy territory 54 30'N - 08 50'E, 1508 hours at 13,500 feet. Over the Baltic and south of Sweden the group leader decided to guide left on another combat wing for mutual defensive support. The return route was not as briefed but slightly north of course.

(5). English Coast was crossed at Gremer 1723 hours at 1,800 feet and base was reached at 1801 hours by lead aircraft.

b. Low 92nd Bomb Group Squadron of the 40th Combat Wing Composite High Group ~~XX~~.

(1). Seven (7) A/C from the 92nd Bomb Group assembled for low squadron of the high composite group of the 40th Combat Wing. Any information concerning this squadron can be found in the General Narrative of the 306th Bomb Group which was leading the Composite Group.

(2). Diagrams A, B, C, D, show rendezvous formation and target formation.

3. A/C not attacking.

a. Lead Group Formation: Of the twenty-one (21) A/C taking off from the 92nd Bomb Group, nineteen (19) attacked the target of opportunity (Stettin) and one (1) A/C six minutes later attacked another target of opportunity.

b. A/C 42-30649 - Sortie Credit. This A/C ~~was lost before the target~~ ~~was lost before the target~~ ~~was lost before the target~~ was lost before the target by enemy fighters and flak.

c. A/C 42-107012 - Sortie credit. This A/C could not bomb Stettin with the group because of bomb rack malfunction but six minutes later a salvo release was made over 53 30'N - 14 50'E. This A/C is considered attacking a target of opportunity.

3. (A) Seven (7) A/C Low Sqdn. High Composite Group 40th Combat Wing.

a. Of the seven (7) A/C taking off from the 92nd Bomb Group to fly with the composite high group only four (4) attacked the target.

(1). A/C 42-107044, A/C 42-31587 and 42-31248 all received Sortie Credit. These A/C failed to ~~return~~ attack because they were lost before the target by enemy fighters and flak.

4. Aircraft Lost.

a. Lead Group.

(1). A/C 42-30649 - This A/C was lost before the target by enemy fighters and flak.

(2). A/C 42-31362 - This A/C was lost ~~h~~ after attacking the target by enemy fighters and flak.

b. Seven (7) A/C Low Squadron, High Composite Group.

(1). A/C 42-107044, 42-31587, 42-31248 these a/c were shot down by enemy fighters and flak before the target.

(2). A/C 42-97240, 42-31548, 42-97243 these a/c were shot down by enemy fighters and flak after the target.

5. Statistical Summary.

	Main Gp.	Low Sqdn.	Totals
a. Number of A/C taking off	21	7	28
b. Unused spares	0	0	0
c. A/C taking off less unused spares	21	7	28
d. Number of A/C dispatched	21	7	28
e. Number of Sorties	21	7	28
f. Number of A/C attacking	20	4	24
g. Number of A/C not attacking	1	3	4

Number of A/C Lost

a. To flak	0	0	0
b. To flak and E/A	2	6	8
c. To E/A	0	0	0
d. Accident	0	0	0
e. Unknown	0	0	0

TOTAL..... 2 7 9