

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY SECOND BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
Office of the Operations Officer

E-C-4

APC #557
11 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Report on Planning and Execution of Operations, 138th Mission,
11 June 1944, Conches, France.

TO : Commanding Officer, 92nd Bombardment Group (H) AAF, APO 557.

1. Comment on Planning and Execution.

The bomb loading for this operation was received from Headquarters 40th Combat Wing by Capt. Prasse at 2150 hours 10 June 1944. The order called for fifty-two (52) B-17's, two (2) PFF aircraft and five (5) spares to be loaded with eighteen (18) X 250 lb. GP bombs each with 1/10 sec. nose fuse and 1/40 sec. tail fuse and four (4) with mixed delayed action fuses.

The Field Order was received from Headquarters 1st Bomb Division by Capt. Prasse at 0055 hours, 11 June 1944. Flight plans and details of the mission were completed, briefing being set for 0130 hours and take-off time 0430 hours.

2. General Narrative.

a. Take-off was accomplished by fifty-two (52) B-17's, two (2) PFF aircraft, and five (5) spares, beginning at 1031 hours. The fifty-two (52) B-17's and two (2) PFF aircraft from the 92nd Group comprised the 40th Combat Wing "A". The five spares were to fill in any abortives. Heavy multi-layer clouds prevailed at assembly altitude and therefore, it was lowered two thousand feet. Shortly later, the assembly altitude had to be raised one thousand feet. The second deviation was not acknowledged by the High Group leader. The entire route over England was followed according to flight plan except for altitude. Due to the series of multi-layer clouds, the low and high groups could not maintain contact in combat wing formation. The lead group departed the English coast on time, and the low and high groups rendezvoused with the lead group ten (10) miles from departure point.

b. Before the enemy coast was entered, the Combat Wing Leader announced over VHF that the bombing would be done visually by groups. At 0651½ hours the 40th Combat Wing "A" entered the enemy coast at an altitude of 17,200 feet.

(1). The lead group attempted to make a visual run on the Primary Target at 0707 hours but found the target area at the edge of a 7 to 9/10 undercast. A second run was attempted at 0718 hours but this too proved unsuccessful. The Combat Wing leader then announced to the low and high groups over VHF that the PFF target would be attacked. The lead group then accomplished a wide 360 degree turn to the right and attacked the PFF target using blind GH bombing technique. Bombs were dropped on the deputy lead PFF ship which took the lead when the equipment in the lead ship failed. At bombs away, 0747 hours,

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the magnetic heading was 245 degrees and the altitude 15000 feet.

(2) The high group made four (4) visual runs on the Primary Target at the following times: 0708 hours, 0724 hours, 0742 hours and 0749 hours. Sharp 180 degree turns enabled the group to make so many runs. This group could not bomb the Primary Target because of cloud cover and followed the lead group to the PFF target. The high group dropped its bombs on the smoke trails of the lead group on a magnetic heading of 250 degrees at 0753 hours from an altitude of 14,200 feet.

(3) The low group made three (3) visual runs on the Primary Target at 0707 hours, 0720 hours and 0745 hours. This group did not bomb the PFF target because it was not in combat wing formation or in trail of the lead group. Bombs were brought back to base.

c. After the target, the three groups rallied, but combat wing formation could not be maintained because of multi-layered clouds. A descent was begun to keep under a dropping layer. The low group, in an effort to keep out of the clouds, flew north of the briefed course and received moderate accurate flak from Guernsey Island at 0903 hours at 5000 feet.

d. The English coast was entered by the lead group at 0941 hours, the high group at 0934 hours and the low group at 0930 hours. The lead aircraft of the lead group reached base at 1024 hours, low group 1040 hours and high group at 1025 hours. Three aircraft landed away from base.

3. Aircraft Not Attacking.

a. Of the fifty-two (52) B-17's, two (2) PFF aircraft and five (5) spares which took off from the 92nd Group, a total of thirty-three (33) attacked target, which was PFF.

(1) The sixteen (16) B-17's and two (2) PFF in the lead group all attacked the target.

(2) Of the eighteen (18) B-17's in the high group, fourteen (14) attacked the target. Aircraft 42-39851 failed to find the formation, 42-3385 was not in formation at bombs away and failed to drop, 42-97245 released its bombs early, 42-31765 released its bombs early dropping on 42-97245.

(3) The entire eighteen (18) aircraft in the low group failed to attack the target. This group was not in combat wing formation at bombs away and could not drop its bombs on the combat wing leader or on the smoke trails.

(4) Of the five (5) spare B-17's that took off, one (1) 42-102424 attacked the target with the high group. Three (3) spares 42-97225, 42-38156 and 42-31250 returned early as unused spares. A/C 42-3461 flew as spare with the 306th Group but did not attack.

4. Aircraft Lost. None.

5. Statistical Summary. (Does not include any PFF aircraft).

	LEAD	HIGH	LOW	SPARES	TOTAL
a. Number of A/C taking off.....	16	18	18	5	57
b. Unused Spares.....	0	0	0	3	3
c. A/C taking off less unused spares	16	18	18	2	54
d. Number of A/C dispatched.....	16	18	18	5	57
e. Number of sorties.....	16	17	18	2	53
f. Number of A/C attacking.....	16	14	0	1	31
g. Number of A/C not attacking.....	0	4	18	4	26

Number of A/C lost.
None.