

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY SECOND BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
Office of the Operations Officer

E-D-4

APC #557
18 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Report on Planning and Execution of Operations, 142nd
Mission, 17 June 1944, Illiers L'Eveque A/D, France.

TO : Commanding Officer, 92nd Bombardment Group (H) AAF, APC 557.

1. Comment on Planning and Execution.

The bomb loading for this operation was received from Headquarters 40th Combat Wing by Capt. Smyrl at 0400 hours, 17 June 1944. The order called for thirty-four (34) B-17's plus four (4) spares to be loaded with 18 X 250 lb. GP bombs each with 1/10 sec. nose fuse and 1/40 sec. tail fuse and two (2) GH aircraft.

The Field Order was received from Headquarters, 1st Bomb Division by Capt. Smyrl at 0745 hours, 17 June 1944. Flight plans and details of the mission were completed, briefing being set for 0750 hours and take-off time 0840 hours.

2. General Narrative.

a. Take-off was accomplished by thirty-four (34) B-17's and three (3) spares from the 92nd Group, plus two (2) GH aircraft, beginning at 0852 hours. These aircraft assembled on the Mount Farm Buncher to form the lead and low groups of the 40th "A" Combat Wing. The Lead Group assembled at 15,000 feet and departed the Buncher at 1056 hours, fifty (50) minutes late. The delay in departing the Buncher was due to the high (305th) Group, which was late in taking off and assembling. The High and Low Groups rendezvoused in position with the Lead Group shortly after departing the buncher.

b. The Lead Group flew directly to the English coast in an effort to make up the lost time. The coast was departed over Beachy Head at 1117 hours, 21,000 feet. The French coast was crossed at 1133 hours, 21,000 feet at a position of 50 degrees, 00'N, 01 degrees, 17'E where moderate accurate flak was encountered.

c. Neither the lead nor the High Groups were able to bomb the primary target because the special equipment in each of the Lead aircraft became jammed and 10/10 cloud prevented visual bombing.

d. On the return trip, the special bombing equipment of the Low Group gave better results and a target of opportunity was seen through breaks in the overcast. At 1316 hours the Low Group started a 360 degree turn to the left and made a visual bombing run on the target of opportunity. Bombs were released at 1329 hours from 21,000 feet on a magnetic heading of 30 degrees.

e. The Lead Group which did not bomb departed the enemy coast at 1350 hours and entered the English coast at 1424 hours. The base was reached at 1513 hours and the lead aircraft landed at 1518 hours.

f. The Low Group departed the enemy coast at 1415 hours and entered the English coast at 1441 hours. The base was reached at 1530 hours and the lead aircraft landed at 1538 hours.

g. Good fighter escort was in evidence throughout the mission.

3. Aircraft Not Attacking.

a. One (1) aircraft, #42-102921 returned early with #4 engine feathered due to drop in oil pressure. This aircraft flew #5 position in the Low Squadron of the Low Group. Spare aircraft filled in.

4. Lost Aircraft.
None.

5. Statistical Summary.
See Attached diagram.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

DIVISION FIELD ORDER NO. 396

DATE 17 June 1944

GROUP 92nd

SECRET

LINE NO.		LEAD FORMATION 40th A		LOW FORMATION 40th A		FORMATION		FORMATION	
		REGULAR	REF GH	REGULAR	REF GH	REGULAR	PF	REGULAR	PF
1	No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off	0	0	0	0				
2	No. of Aircraft Airborne	19	1	18	1				
3	No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares	17	1	17	1				
4	No. of Aircraft Sorties	17	1	17	1				
5	No. of Aircraft Attacking	0	0	17	1				
	Name of Primary Target	Chateaudun A/D		Chateaudun A/D					
	(a) No. Aircraft Attacking Primary Target	0	0	0	0				
	(b) No. Size and Type of Bomb								
7	Name of Secondary Target								
	(a) No. Aircraft Attacking Secondary Target	0	0	0	0				
	(b) No. Size and Type of Bomb								
8	Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)			Illiers L'Evergue A/D					
	(a) No. Aircraft Attacking T.O.	0	0	17	1				
	(b) No. Size and Type of Bomb			321 X 250 GP M4-57					
9	Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)								
	(a) No. Aircraft Attacking (T.O.)								
	(b) No. Size and Type of Bomb								
10	No. of Aircraft Not Attacking	17	1	1	0				
11	No. of Aircraft Lost	0	0	0	0				